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THE RIGHT NOT TO HOLD A POLITICAL 
OPINION: IMPLICATIONS FOR  
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Stephen Meili* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the vastly different approaches taken by 
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom toward asylum claims based on political neutrality. 
In the recent case of RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (UKSC 38 (2012)), the U.K. Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of several apolitical Zimbabweans who sought asylum in the United 
Kingdom on the grounds that they would be tortured if they refused to 
swear allegiance to the Mugabe regime if deported. This case stands in 
stark contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in INS v. Elias-
Zacarias (502 U.S. 478 (1992)), which denied asylum to an apolitical 
Guatemalan man who fled to the United States after resisting the 
recruitment efforts of guerillas fighting a civil war against the 
government.   
This Article uses these two seminal cases to illustrate the wide 
gulf between U.S. and U.K. jurisprudence in their reliance on 
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international human rights norms and foreign law. In RT 
(Zimbabwe), the U.K. Supreme Court referenced numerous human 
rights treaties, as well as the jurisprudence of several common law 
countries (including the United States) in holding that those who 
choose not to express a political opinion—for whatever reason—are 
entitled to the same protection from persecution that extends to the 
politically active and vocal. In Elias-Zacarias, on the other hand, the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not cite any international or foreign law. Its 
decision was based entirely on statutory interpretation of the U.S. law 
governing asylum.  
This Article contributes to the literature on the human rights 
approach to asylum law, which argues that domestic courts 
considering asylum claims should be guided by the norms promoted in 
human rights treaties. RT (Zimbabwe) embraces this approach; Elias-
Zacarias ignores it. This contrast begs the question that this article 
interrogates: does the human rights approach to asylum law make a 
difference to asylum-seekers? It approaches this question through a 
counterfactual analysis: would Mr. Elias-Zacarias have obtained 
asylum before the U.K. Supreme Court, and how would the claimants 
in RT (Zimbabwe) have fared before the U.S. Supreme Court?  
In addition, this Article suggests how U.S. courts might rely 
on the rulings of their sister signatories to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees in ways that would promote a 
uniform interpretation of that treaty across national borders. It also 
suggests ways that lawyers representing refugees in the United States 
might utilize a human rights-based approach to refugee law to benefit 
clients. And finally, it considers whether one of the factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of human rights treaties is the 
adoption of the human rights approach to asylum law by the domestic 
courts of a ratifying country. 
INTRODUCTION 
Persecution in response to the expression of a political opinion 
is one of the fundamental grounds for asylum.1 International human 
                                                                                                                                     
1.  Under Article I A(2) of the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees, in order to obtain asylum, a person must demonstrate a  
“well-founded fear” of being persecuted in her home country “for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 660 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967) 
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rights treaties and other instruments guarantee protection for 
expressing a point of view in opposition to the ruling regime.2 But 
what about the right not to hold a political opinion? In most nations, 
citizens can choose to be agnostic on political issues with few 
repercussions. In some situations, however, political neutrality can 
result in the incarceration, rape, and murder of those who refuse to 
swear allegiance to a political regime or other powerful entity. Should 
asylum be available to those threatened with such persecution? And 
if so, on what basis? 
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom confronted this 
issue in its landmark 2012 decision in RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.3 That case involved several apolitical 
Zimbabweans who sought asylum in the United Kingdom on the 
grounds that they would face murder, rape, or other forms of 
persecution if they refused to swear allegiance to the Mugabe regime 
upon returning to Zimbabwe. The U.K. Home Secretary argued that 
the applicants were not entitled to asylum because their political 
neutrality was a matter of indifference rather than commitment. 
The U.K. Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the Refugee 
Convention and the European Convention4 provide protection to  
                                                                                                                                     
[hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The 1967 Protocol maintained all provisions of the 
Refugee Convention but deleted certain temporal and geographic restrictions to 
recognize changes in the causes of forced migration since World War II. See 
Deborah Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States 2, n.1 (2014) [hereinafter 
Anker (2014)] (explaining the context of creation of the Protocol). 
2.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 18 & 
19. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (Article 18 of both of these 
instruments guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
Article 19 of both instruments guarantees the right to hold opinions without 
interference.). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter “ECHR” or 
“European Convention”] (Article 9 of the ECHR guarantees the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion. Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression.). 
3.  RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2012] UKSC 38 (U.K.). 
4.  Refugee Convention, supra note 1; European Convention, supra note 2. 
The United Kingdom effectively incorporated the European Convention into its 
domestic law when it included it as an appendix to the Human Rights Act, which 
went into effect in Scotland in July 1999, and Wales and England in October 
2000. Richard Maiman, Asylum Law Practice in the United Kingdom After the 
Human Rights Act, in The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in 
Legal Practice 410 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005). 
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those who refuse to express a political opinion, regardless of  
their motivation. In doing so, the Court rejected the Home  
Office’s distinction between asylum-seekers whose neutrality is 
“conscientious or committed” and those who have “given no thought to 
political matters because the subject simply is of no interest to 
[them].”5 
RT (Zimbabwe) stands in stark contrast to the 1992 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.6 Elias-Zacarias fled 
Guatemala for the United States in 1987 after guerillas 
unsuccessfully attempted to recruit him, using thinly veiled threats 
to his life in the process. He supported neither side in the conflict, but 
believed the guerillas would retaliate against him for his refusal to 
join them. The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia writing for a 
6-3 majority, held that Elias-Zacarias had not presented sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the guerillas would persecute him upon 
his return to Guatemala because of his political beliefs.7 
Elias-Zacarias seriously questioned political neutrality as 
grounds for asylum.8 Indeed, since that decision, few U.S. courts have 
held that passive neutrality alone suffices to justify a grant of 
asylum.9 In most cases, a claimant must affirmatively articulate her 
                                                                                                                                     
5.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, ¶ 41. 
6.  502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
7.  The majority opinion states:  
[W]e need not decide whether the evidence compels the 
conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion. Even 
if it does, Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that  
the record also compels the conclusion that he has a ‘well-
founded’ fear that the guerillas will persecute him because  
of that political opinion, rather than because of his  
refusal to fight with them . . . [H]e has not done so at all.  
502 U.S. at 483. 
8.  See Shelley M. Hall, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and 
the Search for a Human Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 105, 
131 (1998) (explaining the impact of the Elias-Zacarias case on the doctrine of 
political neutrality as grounds for asylum). The Elias-Zacarias case has also been 
criticized by scholars for requiring that asylum applicants prove the intent of 
their persecutor. See James C. Hathaway, The Causal Nexus in International 
Refugee Law, 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207, 208 (2002). See also Karen Musalo, 
Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights 
Norms, 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1179, 1181 (1994) (analyzing the Elias-Zacarias 
decision as part of a trend of Supreme Court cases that shifts the analysis away 
from the impact on the claimant and onto the intent of the persecutor). 
9.  Hall, supra note 8, at 129–31, citing Deborah Anker, Law of Asylum in 
the United States: A Guide to Administrative Practice and Case Law 128–31 (2d 
2015] The Right Not to Hold a Political Opinion 5 
neutrality.10 The U.K. Supreme Court required no such profession of 
neutrality in RT (Zimbabwe).11 
One key distinction between these two Supreme Court 
opinions is the contrasting degree that they relied upon international 
human rights law, as well as foreign law, in justifying their 
conflicting results.12 In RT (Zimbabwe), the U.K. Supreme Court 
extensively referenced several international human rights 
instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), as interpretive aids in determining that the Refugee 
Convention protects those who are passively neutral.13 It also 
referenced judicial decisions in several other countries, including the 
United States, which had considered the right not to express a 
political opinion in a variety of contexts.14 In Elias-Zacarias, on the 
other hand, human rights norms and foreign law played no role 
whatsoever.15 
RT (Zimbabwe) and Elias-Zacarias exemplify two very 
different ways of analyzing asylum claims. RT (Zimbabwe) employed 
the human rights approach to asylum law, according to which the 
standard for what constitutes persecution under the Refugee 
                                                                                                                                     
ed. 1991); see also Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 372–74 (discussing neutrality as 
insufficient grounds for establishing a viable asylum claim). 
10.  See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating “the 
applicant ‘must not merely avow his political neutrality, however, but must also 
show that this opinion was articulated sufficiently for it to be the basis of his past 
or anticipated persecution.’”) (quoting Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863 
(9th Cir.1995)). 
11.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 45. 
12.  There are numerous and significant factual differences between the two 
cases, which will be described in more depth later in this article. However, these 
differences do not, in my view, mitigate the importance of the very different 
approaches to neutrality that the two courts adopt. 
13.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, paras. 32–33. 
14.  Id. paras. 34–35, 37–39. 
15.  As will be discussed in more detail later in this Article, U.S. courts 
rarely rely on their sister signatories’ interpretations of relevant human rights 
treaties. See Fatma Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum 
Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 391, 393 (2013) (arguing that in the case 
of the Refugee Convention, this reluctance detracts from the effort among judges 
and scholars in many refugee-receiving nations to arrive at a shared 
interpretation of treaty terms). See also Hélène Lambert, Transnational Law, 
Judges and Refugees in the EU, in The Limits of Transnational Law 1, 4–5 (Guy 
S. Goodwin-Gill & Hélène Lambert eds., 2010) (describing how the judicial 
globalization phenomenon exists among Commonwealth countries but not outside 
the Commonwealth). 
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Convention is the sustained or systemic denial of human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of state protection.16 The U.K. Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the claimants, in part, because their 
fundamental human right to refrain from expressing a political 
opinion would be violated if they were forced to return to Zimbabwe.17 
Elias-Zacarias followed a statutory interpretation model: the 
majority concluded, relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that 
Mr. Elias-Zacarias had failed to satisfy the criteria for asylum under 
U.S. law.18 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Elias-Zacarias 
inquired into the human rights implications of returning the claimant 
to Guatemala. 
Comparing these approaches to analyzing asylum claims 
suggests that using human rights treaties can make the difference 
between life and death. It is no stretch to argue that the U.K. 
Supreme Court’s reliance on international human rights law helped 
the claimants in RT (Zimbabwe) avoid persecution and possible 
death, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to reference such 
law may have contributed to the rejection of Mr. Elias-Zacarias’ 
claim. 
By considering this issue, this Article contributes to 
scholarship and practice on human rights and asylum law in four 
ways. First, it considers how the human rights approach to asylum 
law informs the definition of “political opinion” and whether that 
approach results in a broader basis of protection than offered by the 
statutory interpretation model followed by most courts in the United 
States. Second, it suggests how U.S. courts might rely on the rulings 
of their sister signatories to the Refugee Convention in ways that lead 
to an internationally uniform interpretation of that treaty.19 Third, it 
                                                                                                                                     
16.  James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 183 
(2d ed. 2014). 
17.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, paras. 41–42, 61. 
18.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482–83. 
19.  Refugee law lacks an international court to harmonize different states’ 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. See Lambert, supra note 15, at 4. 
Given such a vacuum, senior appellate courts in many common law countries 
routinely engage in transnational dialogue about the scope of the refugee 
definition and are committed to finding common ground. See James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 1–2 (2005). The International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) is an institutional example of efforts 
towards finding such common ground. Created in Warsaw in 1997, the IARLJ 
seeks to develop consistent approaches to the interpretations and application of 
refugee law. See Kate Jastram & Marilyn Achiron, UNHCR, Refugee Protection: 
A Guide to International Refugee Law 35 (2001), available at 
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suggests ways that lawyers representing refugees in the United 
States might utilize a human rights-based approach to refugee law to 
benefit clients. And finally, it considers whether one of the factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of human rights treaties is the 
adoption of the human rights approach to asylum law by the domestic 
courts of a ratifying country. 
Part I begins with a review of scholarship on the human 
rights approach to asylum law. Part II briefly describes the asylum 
adjudication processes in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Parts III and IV review U.S. and U.K. law on neutrality as a basis for 
asylum, focusing on the decisions in Elias-Zacarias and RT 
(Zimbabwe), respectively. Part V analyzes the potential result in 
these two cases had each applicants brought their claim in the other 
country. Finally, the Article concludes with reflections about how the 
comparison of these Supreme Court cases contributes to scholarship 
and practice on human rights treaties and asylum law. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK—THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACH TO ASYLUM LAW 
In domestic courts in many countries of the world, the human 
rights approach is the dominant theory of interpreting and applying 
refugee law.20 It promotes affording protection to those seeking 
asylum in any state party to the Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol 
based upon a core set of rights established in several human rights 
treaties.21 According to this approach, refugee law is a system of 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.html; see also The Association – Introduction, 
IARLJ.org, http://www.iarlj.org/general/iarlj/the-association (stating a high-level 
overview of the history and mission of the IARIJ) (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
20.  Hélène Lambert, International Refugee Law: Dominant and Emerging 
Approaches, in Routledge Handbook of International Law 344–45 (David 
Armstrong ed., 2009). 
21.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 193–208.  The treaties and other 
instruments considered to form the core set of human rights protections are the 
ICCPR, the UDHR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for 
signature Nov. 20, 1989, art. 1, 144 U.N.T.S. 123, (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) 
[hereinafter CRC]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into 
force Jan. 3, 1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 1, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), and the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 
Mar. 7, 1966, art. 1, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2, at [S. Exec. Doc. page] (1978), 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, [U.N.T.S.] (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Race 
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protecting human rights when the asylum-seeker’s home country is 
unable to offer such protection.22 The human rights approach 
emphasizes the human rights obligations of receiving states toward 
asylum-seekers and other refugees.23 That is, domestic courts must 
adjudicate asylum claims in accordance with international human 
rights norms, as well as domestic law.24 
The human rights approach manifests itself most prominently 
through domestic court interpretation of undefined terms in the 
Refugee Convention, such as “being persecuted.”25 According to 
                                                                                                                                     
Convention]. See Roger Haines QC, Deputy Chair, Refugee Status Appeals Auth., 
Paper given at the IARLJ Australia/New Zealand Chapter Meeting: The 
Intersection of Human Rights Law and Refugee Law: On or Off the Map: The 
Challenge of Locating Appellant S395/2002 ¶ 9 (June 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.refugee.org.nz/Reference/Sydney04.html (arguing the more principled 
approach is for courts to determine the nature of the “right” asserted by the 
claimant, prior to addressing the issue of risk). 
22.  According to Deborah Anker, the human rights approach assists both 
the refugee law and human rights regimes. See Deborah Anker, Refugee Law, 
Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 133, 143 (2002) 
[hereinafter Anker (2002)]. (It aids, for example, the refugee law regime by 
elevating its status above that of “poor cousin” within the human rights milieu, 
and it aids the human rights regime by showing that human rights treaties can 
have demonstrable, positive impacts (e.g., helping an individual obtain protection 
from persecution or other serious harm)). Some scholars have critiqued 
Hathaway’s conception of the human rights approach as too limited. For example, 
Kate Jastram’s critique is more structural, as she asserts “significant differences 
between human rights analysis and refugee status determination,” suggesting 
that it is difficult to align the two regimes in any meaningful way. See Kate 
Jastram, Economic Harm as a Basis for Refugee Status and the Application of 
Human Rights Law to the Interpretation of Economic Persecution in Critical 
Issues in International Refugee Law 143 (James C. Simeon, ed., 2010). 
23.  Guy Goodwin-Gill “Refugees and their Human Rights”, Refugee Studies 
Centre Working Paper No. 17 (Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2004), available at 
http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/workingpaper17.pdf.; Hathaway (2005), supra note 
19;  Hélène Lambert, Protection against refoulement  from Europe: human rights 
law comes to the rescue (1999) ICLQ, 48:515-44; Hélène Lambert, The European 
Convention on Human Rights and the protection of refugees: limits and 
opportunities (2005) RSQ, 24: 39–55. 
24.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 194. 
25.  In addition to providing a means of interpreting the Refugee 
Convention, human rights treaties have assisted refugees in at least two other 
ways: first, they include procedural protections not delineated in the Refugee 
Convention. Thus, for example, Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child requires States Parties to afford children “the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child . . . .” CRC, supra 
note 21, article 12.2. And second, they offer complementary or subsidiary 
protection to noncitizens, providing a source of relief independent of the protection 
2015] The Right Not to Hold a Political Opinion 9 
proponents of this approach, it is appropriate—and logical—to rely on 
human rights treaties because these treaties reflect a global 
consensus about the scope of persecutory harms.26 As such, they offer 
a more objective approach than an individual state’s view about 
whether conduct constitutes persecution under the Refugee 
Convention, and provide a bulwark against arguments that the harm 
asserted by a claimant is considered acceptable within a particular 
country or culture.27 Human rights treaties also ensure that the 
standard for what constitutes persecution remains dynamic, adapting 
to evolving norms and conditions throughout the world.28 
Upper level courts in numerous common law countries have, 
to varying degrees, adopted the human rights approach to asylum law 
over the past two decades.29 Thus, for example, in Gashi v. Secretary 
                                                                                                                                     
offered by the Refugee Convention. Complementary protection is grounded on the 
international law principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits a country from 
returning a non-citizen to a territory where she is likely to face torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. See generally Jason Pobjoy, A 
Child Rights Framework for Assessing the Status of Refugee Children, Cambridge 
University Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 27/2013 (2013) at 29; 
Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights 28, 34 
(2007); Jane Mcadam, Complementary Protection In International Refugee Law 
(2007); Jastram, supra note 22; Guy Goodwin-Gill & Jane Mcadam, The Refugee 
In International Law (2007); Anker (2002), supra note 22, at 143;  Hathaway 
(2005), supra  note 19. 
26.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16 at 194. 
27.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16 at 194. 
28.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16 at 194–95 (citing Bayatyan v. 
Armenia, Application no. 23459/03, ¶¶ 98, 102 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July, 7, 2011), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105611.  
It is:  
of crucial importance that the [Refugee] Convention is 
interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights 
practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory . . . . [The] 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in 
the light of present-day conditions and of the ideas prevailing in 
democratic States today . . . . 
See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 362–63 (explaining that this evolving 
approach to the interpretation of the Refugee Convention is exemplified by the 
“membership in a particular social group” grounds for asylum, which has evolved 
in recent years to include persecution based on gender, sexual orientation, family, 
age, and disability). 
29.  For a comprehensive summary of the increasing acceptance of the 
human rights approach by common law courts, civil law decision-makers, the 
UNHCR, and human rights scholars, see Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 
196–208. In addition, through documents such as its Handbook, the UNCHR has 
demonstrated support for this approach. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 
10 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [46.3:1 
of State for the Home Department, the U.K. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal held that “the principles of an internationally shared 
surrogate protection, rooted in fundamental human rights, 
constitutes the basic approach to interpreting the word 
‘persecution.’”30 Moreover, there is a consensus among senior courts in 
most common law countries (as well as decision-makers in many civil 
law countries) that the rather broad contours of the Refugee 
Convention notion of “being persecuted” should be interpreted by 
taking into account the broader international human rights 
framework.31 Additionally, most scholars also favor a broadening of 
the Refugee Convention’s definition of “refugee” that is consistent 
with human rights principles.32 
Courts and administrative agencies in the United States, on 
the other hand, rarely follow the human rights approach.33 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                     
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter “UNHCR Handbook” or 
“Handbook”]. 
30.  [1997] INLR 96. This reasoning was adopted by the U.K. Court of 
Appeal (see, e.g., Amare v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 
A11 ER (D) 300) and the House of Lords (which has now become the U.K. 
Supreme Court) (see, e.g., R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah [1999] 
Imm 2 A.C. 629; 644B-H, 648B, 651A, 652C, 653F, 658H). 
31.  See Pobjoy, supra note 25, at 28 n.157. 
32.  See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill & Mcadam, supra note 25, at 91, 131–33; A. 
Zimmerman & C. Mahler, Article 1A, para. 2 (Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’), in 
The 1951 Convention Relating To The Status Of Refugees And Its 1967 Protocol: 
A Commentary 346–47 (A. Zimmerman ed., 2011); Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 
198–210; Kay Hailbronner et al., EU Immigration And Asylum Law: Commentary 
On EU Regulations And Directives 1067 (Kay Hailbronner ed., 2010); Hemme 
Battjes, European Asylum Law And International Law 289 (Elspeth Guild & Jan 
Niessen eds., 2006); Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 196–97. Hathaway and 
Foster also argue that the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in treaties 
like CEDAW and CERD should inform the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention’s “for reasons of” clause, which requires a nexus between the harm 
feared and one of the five Convention grounds for asylum. Hathaway & Foster, 
supra note 16, at 390–91. 
33.  See Michelle Foster, Int’l Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: 
Refuge from Deprivation (2007). However, one example of an explicit embrace of 
the human rights approach in interpreting the meaning of “persecution” under 
the Refugee Convention is the opinion in Stenaj v. Gonzalez, which held that 
“whether the treatment feared by a claimant violates recognized standards of 
basic human rights can determine whether persecution exists.” Stenaj v. 
Gonzalez, 227 F. App’x 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 
634, 638–39 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing the Report of the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, and the U.N. General Assembly in 
support of its finding that female genital mutilation “has been internationally 
2015] The Right Not to Hold a Political Opinion 11 
when U.S. courts adjudicate asylum cases, they normally focus on the 
U.S. domestic statute governing asylum (the Refugee Act of 1980, 
which adopted the Refugee Convention’s definition of “refugee”), 
adhering to U.S. precedent on statutory interpretation.34 They rarely 
refer to human rights treaties or foreign court interpretations of the 
Refugee Convention for guidance.35 This aversion to relying on human 
rights norms in interpreting domestic statutes was articulated most 
dramatically by Justice Scalia (the author of the majority opinion in 
Elias-Zacarias) who referred to international human rights law as 
the new “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”36 
While this contrast in approaches to deciding asylum claims 
is interesting from a comparative jurisprudential standpoint,  
the more immediate issue is whether it makes a difference for  
asylum-seekers. That is, do asylum-seekers in those countries that 
have adopted the human rights approach to asylum law fare better in 
the asylum process than they would in the United States?37 This 
Article considers this question within the context of whether “political 
opinion” under the Refugee Convention includes political neutrality. 
That is, does human rights law allow for a broader interpretation of 
“political opinion” than is the case under U.S. law? And if so, do 
applicants whose claims are based on neutrality have a greater 
chance of obtaining asylum in countries that embrace the human 
rights approach? 
                                                                                                                                     
recognized as a violation of women’s and female children’s rights”)); see also 
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “[deplores] the 
continuing discriminatory practices against women and girls which impede the 
enjoyment of their rights . . . .”); Hathaway & Foster, supra  note 16, at 196, n.80. 
34.  Marouf, supra note 15, at 393. 
35.  Id. According to Marouf, this failure to consider sister signatories’ 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention contravenes the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
directive that such interpretations are entitled to “considerable weight.” Id. (citing 
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010)). 
36.  William S. Dodge, Justice Scalia on Foreign Law and the Constitution, 
Opinio Juris (Feb. 22, 2006, 2:19 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/02/22/justice-
scalia-on-foreign-law-and-the-constitution (quoting Justice Scalia’s remarks in a 
speech at the American Enterprise Institute). 
37.  During the four year period between 2009 and 2012 (the last year for 
which data is available in both countries), the asylum grant rate was 51.5% in the 
United States and 31.6% in the United Kingdom. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 
2013 Statistics Yearbook (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf; House of Commons Library, Asylum Statistics (2014), 
available at http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-areas/services-client-groups/asylum-
seekers-refugees/houseofcommonslibrary/163170SN01403.pdf. Of course, 
numerous factors contribute to the asylum grant rate in a particular country. 
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The answers to these questions will contribute to the 
scholarship on the human rights approach to asylum in at least two 
ways: first, they will suggest whether that approach offers guidance 
on the meaning of “political opinion,” “being persecuted,” and “for 
reasons of” under the Refugee Convention; and second they will 
suggest how that approach might—or might not—enhance protection 
for refugees whose asylum claim are based on political neutrality. 
In addition, this Article supplements my previous research on 
the impact of human rights treaties on domestic court asylum 
jurisprudence, by considering whether a country’s adoption of the 
human rights approach provides more effective protection to asylum-
seekers.38 In empirical studies of published decisions in Canada and 
the United Kingdom since the early 1990s, I found statistically 
significant relationships between references to human rights treaties 
that assisted refugees to obtain asylum or complementary protection 
and two variables: whether the destination country had incorporated 
the treaty into its domestic law, and the gender of the applicant.39 I 
also found that in certain situations, human rights-based claims can 
hurt asylum-seekers, such as when refugee lawyers overuse them to 
the point that they obfuscate an otherwise straightforward case 
                                                                                                                                     
38.  See Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum-Seekers? 
Lessons from the U.K., 48 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 123 (2015) (exploring the 
connection between human rights and the protection of asylum seekers) 
[hereinafter Meili (2015)]; Stephen Meili, When Do Human Rights Treaties Help 
Asylum-Seekers? A Study of Theory and Practice in Canadian Jurisprudence Since 
1990, 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625 (2014) [hereinafter Meili (2014)]. This research 
relates, in turn, to the broader question of the effectiveness of human rights 
treaties more generally, which has been the subject of considerable scholarship 
over the past 15 years. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing 
States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law (Oxford Univ. Press 
ed., 2013); Alison Brysk & Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, The Politics of the 
Globalization of Law, in The Politics Of The Globalization Of Law: Getting From 
Rights To Justice 1–25 (Alison Brysk, ed., 2013); Oona Hathaway, The Promise 
and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in Torture: A Collection 199–212 
(Sanford Levinson, ed. 2004); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1937 (2002); Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated 
Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 97 (2012). 
39.  These empirical studies included published decisions from 
administrative tribunals and appellate courts, as well as interviews with refugee 
lawyers, in both countries. In both Canada and the United Kingdom, judicial 
decisions involving female applicants were more likely than decisions involving 
male applicants to contain references to human rights treaties that assisted the 
applicant in obtaining protection. See Meili (2015), supra note 38; Meili (2014), 
supra note 38. 
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under the Refugee Convention.40 This Article considers whether a 
country’s adoption of the human rights approach to asylum law 
merits inclusion on the list of variables that influence the 
effectiveness of human rights treaties in the asylum context. 
In order to place the analysis of these issues in the proper 
procedural context, this Article will now briefly review the asylum 
adjudication processes in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The domestic law of asylum in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom is based on the Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol.41 The United States incorporated these treaties into its 
domestic law through the Refugee Act of 1980.42 That statute 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”), and 
adopted a definition of “refugee” virtually identical to the Refugee 
Convention.43 
The United Kingdom’s Asylum and Immigration Appeals  
Act 1993 requires the Secretary of State to act in accordance  
                                                                                                                                     
40.  Id. 
41.  The United States has never ratified the Refugee Convention, but 
acceded to the 1967 Protocol. See Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 2–10; Mark 
Symes & Peter Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice 1–6 (2010); Dallal Stevens, U.K. 
Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 127–30 
(2004). 
42.  See Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 2 (indicating that the purpose of the 
Refugee Act was to harmonize U.S. law with the Refugee Convention). The U.S. 
approach to refugee status determinations prior to the passage of the Refugee Act 
has been described as ad hoc. Marouf, supra note 15, at 398, n.20 (citing Deborah 
Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the 
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9 (1981)). 
43.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) (explaining that 
the legislative history of the Refugee Act demonstrates Congress’ intent was to 
harmonize US law with the Refugee Convention). The main difference between 
the two definitions is that the Refugee Convention requires an applicant for 
asylum to demonstrate that she has a well-founded fear of persecution “for 
reasons of” one or more of the five enumerated grounds for protection (race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social 
group), whereas the 1980 Refugee Act requires an applicant to demonstrate that 
her well-founded fear of persecution is “on account of” one or more of the same five 
enumerated grounds. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Article I(A)(2); INA § 
101(a) (42)(A), 8 U.S.C.§ 1101 (a)(42)(A)(2011). 
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with the Refugee Convention with respect to immigration rules, 
administrative practices, and procedure.44 Moreover, according to the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, of which the United 
Kingdom is a Member, the common asylum policy across the 
European Union “must be in accordance” with the Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol.45 
In broad outline, the asylum adjudication systems in the 
United States and the United Kingdom are very similar.46 In both 
                                                                                                                                     
44.  See Symes & Jorro, supra note 41, at 4–5 (noting that although the 
United Kingdom has never fully incorporated the Refugee Convention into its 
domestic law, according to section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 
which is entitled “Primacy of Convention,” “Nothing in the immigration rules . . . 
shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the [Refugee] Convention.” 
Moreover, in section 1 of the Act, “claim for asylum” is defined as “a claim made 
by a person . . . that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations 
under the [Refugee] Convention for him to be removed from, or required to leave, 
the United Kingdom.”). 
45.  Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 78, ¶ 1 states, in 
relevant part:  
The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection with a view to offering 
appropriate status to any third-country national requiring 
international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance 
with the [Refugee Convention] and the [1967 Protocol], and 
other relevant treaties. 
See also Symes & Jorro, supra note 41, at 2–3. 
46.  In addition to asylum, other forms of refugee protection outside the 
Refugee Convention are available in each country. In the United States, these 
alternatives include humanitarian asylum, which is available when there are 
“compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising 
out of the severity of the past persecution” or if “[t]he applicant has established 
that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm 
upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). Another form of relief 
in the United States is Temporary Protected Status, which protects persons from 
removal to countries experiencing armed conflict or environmental disaster. See 
INA §244, 8 U.S.C. §1254a. A third alternative is withholding of removal, which 
prohibits the United States from returning to her country of origin a person who 
is more likely than not to suffer persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. See INA 
§241 (b)(3)A). In the United Kingdom, an individual can submit a claim for 
complementary protection or a “human rights claim” under the ECHR and the 
Human Rights Act. See Maria O’Sullivan, The Intersection Between the 
International, the Regional and the Domestic: Seeking Asylum in the U.K., in 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspective 228, 251 
(Susan Kneebone ed., 2009). However, none of these forms of protection offer 
applicants the same citizenship rights to which asylees are entitled. McAdam, 
supra note 25 at 5, 12–13; Jean-Francois Durieux, Salah Sheekh is a Refugee: 
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countries, governmental agencies with authority over immigration 
matters make the initial decision: in the United States, the  
decision-maker is an asylum officer within the Department of 
Homeland Security.47 In the United Kingdom, the initial 
determination is made by U.K. Visa and Immigration (formerly the 
U.K. Border Agency), which is part of the Home Office.48 
If asylum is not granted at the initial stage, the applicant in 
each country may pursue the matter before an administrative 
tribunal: an immigration judge in the United States and the First 
Tier of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Tribunal Service 
(IAT) in the United Kingdom.49 Each of these tribunals considers 
asylum claims de novo.50 If an applicant is unsuccessful at the initial 
administrative level, she may appeal to a higher administrative body: 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in the United States and 
the Upper Tribunal of the IAT (“Upper Tribunal”) in the United 
Kingdom.51 In either country, if an applicant is unsuccessful at this 
                                                                                                                                     
New Insights into Primary and Subsidiary Forms of Protection, Refugee Studies 
Centre Working Paper Series No. 49, Oct. 2008, at 8. Thus, asylum is the 
preferred form of relief for refugees and their advocates. 
47.  Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 28. 
48.  See Robert Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A 
Study of Tribunal Adjudication 16–25 (2011) (listing a summary of the many 
changes in the U.K. refugee status determination system over the past two 
decades). See also O’Sullivan, supra note 46, at 251; Sarah Craig and Maria 
Fletcher, The Supervision of Immigration and Asylum Appeals in the  
U.K. — Taking Stock, 24 Int’l J. Refugee L. 1, 60–84 (2012) (providing a detailed 
analysis of the impact of recent legislative reforms on appellate rights within the 
U.K. asylum adjudication process). 
49.  In the First-tier Tribunal, appeals are heard by one or more judges. 
Anker (2014), supra note, 1 at 29; Immigration and Asylum Chamber: First-tier 
Tribunal Guidance, Ministry of Justice (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
tribunals/immigration-asylum. 
50.  See Marouf, supra note 15, at 399. 
51.  The Upper Tribunal is comprised of 40 full-time judges, who hear cases 
individually or in panels of two or three, depending on the scope and importance 
of the case. Robert Thomas, Refugee Roulette: A U.K. Perspective, in Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform, 164 (Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag eds., 2009); Symes & 
Jorro, supra note 41, at 875–1112.  Judges who only occasionally hear appeals to 
the Upper Tribunal are those who have other positions in the judiciary, as well as 
some part-time judges who are either recently retired or still in professional 
practice. See Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber, Ministry of 
Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/immigration-asylum-upper (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015); see also About Us, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmcts/tribunals (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). For a 
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level, she may appeal to a court of appeal and, ultimately, to the 
nation’s Supreme Court.52  
 
III. NEUTRALITY AS GROUNDS FOR ASYLUM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias 
questioned the doctrine of political neutrality as the basis for asylum, 
earlier cases show support for the idea that such neutrality is the 
expression of a political opinion and thus worthy of protection under 
the Refugee Act. This idea was first articulated by the Ninth Circuit 
in Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S.53 Mr. Bolanos-Hernandez, a native 
and citizen of El Salvador, fled to the U.S. amid the conflict between 
government forces and guerillas in his country. He asserted that he 
favored neither side, but that he would be persecuted for refusing to 
join either should he be deported. In overturning the BIA’s rejection 
of his claim, the Ninth Circuit held that neutrality is, in fact, a 
political opinion: “Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political 
decision than is choosing to affiliate with a particular political 
faction.”54 
Judge Reinhardt, who authored the decision in  
Bolanos-Hernandez, did not refer to international norms in 
recognizing neutrality as the basis for a political opinion claim. He 
based his decision entirely on statutory interpretation of the 1980 
                                                                                                                                     
more detailed description of the asylum adjudication system in the United 
Kingdom, see Meili (2015), supra note 38, at 139–41. 
52.  In the United States, appeals of BIA decisions are made to the federal 
circuit court of appeals (bypassing the federal district courts) and then to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In the United Kingdom, appeals of Upper Tribunal decisions are 
made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the Court of Session Inner 
House in Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. 
All appeals from those courts are heard by the United Kingdom Supreme Court, 
which assumed the judicial functions of the House of Lords in 2009. See Symes & 
Jorro, supra note 41, at 875–1112; Appeal a decision by the immigration and 
asylum tribunal, GOV.UK, http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/immigration-
asylum-upper/appeals (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); see A guide to bringing a case to 
The Supreme Court ¶¶ 1.1, 1.2, available at http://supremecourt.uk/docs/a-guide-
to-bringing-a-case-to-the-uksc.pdf; see also Appeals to the Supreme  
Court, The Crown Prosecution Service, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/ 
appeals_to_the_supreme_court/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
53.  767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). 
54.  Id. at 1286. 
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Refugee Act. However, in his subsequent opinion in Hernandez-Ortiz 
v. I.N.S,55 issued in 1985, he explicitly referenced the UNHCR 
Handbook for the proposition that a government’s persecution of 
persons to whom it attributes a political opinion (even erroneously) is 
persecution on account of political opinion.56 He also referenced the 
UNHCR Handbook regarding the interpretation of the “well-founded 
fear” requirement.57 In making these references, Judge Reinhardt 
noted that the Handbook “contains standards for interpreting the 
United Nations Protocol for the Status of Refugees . . . to which the 
United States acceded in 1968, and informed Congress’ actions when 
it passed the Refugee Act in 1980.”58 He also observed that the BIA, 
as well as several federal courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court), 
had referred to the Handbook for guidance.59 Similarly, in  
Barraza v. I.N.S., the Ninth Circuit explicitly relied on the  
Handbook in interpreting the meaning of “persecution . . . on account  
of . . . political opinion.”60 Thus, early U.S. jurisprudence on the scope 
of “political opinion” under the Refugee Convention relied on 
international norms, as articulated by the UNHCR. 
The Ninth Circuit continued to expand the doctrine of 
neutrality throughout the mid–1980s and early 1990s in a series of 
cases that linked neutrality to imputed political opinion.61 That is, as 
long as the persecutor thought that the applicant held an opposing 
political opinion, it did not matter whether the applicant actually had 
                                                                                                                                     
55.  Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). 
56.  Id. at 517. The U.S. Supreme Court had previously identified the 
UNHCR Handbook as a significant source of statutory interpretation in  
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438. 
57.  Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 514 n.3. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. As Marouf notes, the U.S. Supreme Court “has confirmed Congress’s 
intent to actualize our international obligations based on the legislative history of 
the Refugee Act and the adoption of a definition of ‘refugee’ that mirrors  
the definition in the Protocol.” Marouf, supra note 15, at 398, n.25 (citing  
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37). 
60.  Barraza Rivera v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990). In that 
case, the Ninth Circuit determined that an asylum-seeker may qualify for relief 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act after desertion from military 
conscription or draft evasion if he or she can show that continued military service 
would have compelled the applicant to engage in activities “contrary to basic rules 
of human conduct.” Id. at 1451 (quoting UNHCR Handbook, supra note 29,  
at ¶¶ 170–71). 
61.  See Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 328. 
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any opinion at all for purposes of obtaining asylum.62 Indeed, in 
Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., the Ninth Circuit articulated an explicit 
presumption that when the government exerts its military strength 
against members of society who have clearly not committed any crime 
or other actions justifying such use of force, the government’s actions 
are politically motivated.63 Such decisions lightened the applicant’s 
burden of establishing that her persecution was “on account  
of . . . political opinion.” As long as she could demonstrate that the 
persecutor believed (however erroneously) that she opposed the 
government, the nexus requirement would be satisfied. 
The trend in easing the “on account of” burden under U.S.  
law came to an abrupt halt in Elias-Zacarias v. I.N.S.64 Mr.  
Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, sought asylum in the United 
States after guerillas in that country had unsuccessfully attempted to 
recruit him for their cause in 1987.65 Mr. Elias-Zacarias testified that 
he did not want to join the guerillas because they were against the 
government and he feared that if he joined the guerillas the 
government would retaliate against him.66 The Ninth Circuit found in 
favor of Mr. Elias-Zacarias on the grounds that acts of conscription by 
a nongovernmental entity such as the guerillas in Guatemala 
constitute persecution on account of political opinion because “the 
person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion 
                                                                                                                                     
62.  See Lazo-Majano v. I.N.S., 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987);  
Beltran-Zavala v. I.N.S., 912 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990); Auilera-Cota v. I.N.S., 914 
F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 325–27. 
63.  Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516. This presumption was based on the 
Ninth Circuit’s observation that: 
A government does not under ordinary circumstances engage in 
political persecution of those who share its ideology, only of 
those whose views or philosophies differ, at least in the 
government’s perception. It is irrelevant whether a victim’s 
political view is neutrality, as in Bolanos-Hernandez, or 
disapproval of the acts or opinions of the government. 
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses 
any of these opinions as long as the government believes that 
he does. 
Id. at 517. 
64.  See Bruce J. Einhorn, Political Asylum in the Ninth Circuit and the 
Case of Elias-Zacarias, 29 S.D. L. Rev. 597, 609–11 (1992); See also Musalo, supra 
note 8. 
65.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 479–80 (1992). 
66.  Id. at 480. 
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hostile to the persecutor and because the persecutor’s motive in 
carrying out the kidnapping is political.”67 
The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority, reversed.68 In an opinion criticized for its remarkable 
“brevity and lack of analytical content,”69 the majority questioned, but 
did not outright reject, neutrality as a basis for asylum. Initially it 
categorically denied that someone who resists forced recruitment is 
expressing a political opinion (such an assertion “seems to us 
untrue”).70 Later in the opinion, however, the majority softened its 
view somewhat: 
Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides 
with any political faction is itself the affirmative 
expression of a political opinion. That seems to us not 
ordinarily so, since we do not agree with the dissent 
that only a “narrow, grudging construction of the 
concept of ‘political opinion’” . . . should distinguish it 
from such quite different concepts as indifference, 
indecisiveness, and risk averseness.71  
The majority thus drew a distinction between an affirmative 
statement of political neutrality and neutrality based on 
“indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness.”72 Merely sitting on 
the sidelines does not suffice. A successful applicant must make an 
affirmative—one assumes outspoken—expression of neutrality. In 
addition to finding that Mr. Elias-Zacarias had failed to affirmatively 
express his neutrality in a way that would transform it into a political 
opinion, the majority held that Mr. Elias-Zacarias had failed to 
establish that he had a well-founded fear that the guerillas would 
persecute him “on account of” that opinion.73 Under this part of the 
ruling, an applicant must divine the persecutor’s intent: that he or 
she intended to persecute the applicant because of the applicant’s 
political opinion.74 
                                                                                                                                     
67.  Elias-Zacarias v. I.N.S., 921 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1990). 
68.  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 484. 
69.  See Musalo, supra note 8, at 1190. 
70.  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481. 
71.  Id. at 483 (emphasis added). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. (finding that since the statute makes motive critical, the plaintiff 
must provide some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the persecutors’ motive to 
persecute him because of the political opinion). According to Karen Musalo, this 
intent requirement is at odds with the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, 
whose purpose was to protect refugees rather than to punish persecutors. See 
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens (who was joined by Justices 
Blackmun and O’Connor) took the majority to task for rejecting the 
view that neutrality is, in itself, a political opinion: 
A political opinion can be expressed negatively as well 
as affirmatively. A refusal to support a cause—by 
staying home on election day, by refusing to take an 
oath of allegiance, or by refusing to step forward at an 
induction center—can express a political opinion as 
effectively as an affirmative statement or affirmative 
conduct. Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing 
more than a simple desire to continue living an 
ordinary life with one’s family, it is the kind of 
political expression that the asylum provisions of the 
statute were intended to protect.75  
The dissent cautioned that the only persons eligible for 
asylum under the majority’s conception of “political opinion” would be 
those who joined one political extreme or the other: “moderates who 
choose to sit out a battle would not qualify.”76 The dissent also noted 
that the 1980 Refugee Act “speaks simply in terms of a political 
opinion and does not require that the view be well developed or 
elegantly expressed.”77 
The majority opinion did not reference international human 
rights law, which is remarkable given the origins of the 1980 Refugee 
Act.78 Indeed, unlike some of the Ninth Circuit’s prior decisions on 
political neutrality as a ground for asylum, the majority did not even 
cite the UNCHR Handbook for authority or guidance.79 The dissent, 
                                                                                                                                     
Musalo, supra note 8, at 1181. Moreover, the dissent argued that it ignores the 
legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act, on which the Supreme Court had 
previously relied in ruling that in order to establish a “well-founded fear of 
persecution,” a claimant need not prove that it was more likely than not that he or 
she would suffer persecution. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 487 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480, U.S. 421 (1987)). 
75.  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
76.  Id. at 487. 
77.  Id. at 488 n.5. 
78.  In an earlier decision, the U.S. Supreme Court made explicit reference 
to the link between the 1980 Refugee Act and international law. See I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37 (“[I[f one thing is clear from the legislative 
history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that 
one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into 
conformance with the [Protocol], to which the United States acceded in 1968.”). 
79.  The briefs of both parties, as well as all three of the amicus briefs, cited 
to international human rights law. The Respondent’s brief made numerous 
references to the Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the UNCHR 
Handbook. See Brief for Respondent, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) 
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on the other hand, cited the legislative history of the 1980 Refugee 
Act, which referenced the Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol.80 
The majority’s interpretation of “persecution on account  
of . . . political opinion” was based entirely on the U.S. law of 
statutory construction, rather than on how those terms have been 
interpreted by international bodies or courts in other countries: “In 
construing statutes, ‘we must, of course, start with the assumption 
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of 
the words used.’”81 
Justice Scalia went on to conclude that the “ordinary” 
meaning of “political opinion” refers to the opinion of the victim 
rather than the perpetrator, and that not taking sides with any 
political faction is not “ordinarily” the affirmative expression of a 
                                                                                                                                     
(No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 521636. The amicus brief filed by UNHCR asserted, 
“verbal expression of political beliefs simply is not required under the 1951 
Convention definition.” Brief for UNHCR as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 
11003948. The UNCHR brief also cited to Guy Goodwin-Gill’s work for the 
proposition that the refusal to bear arms is a political act, and to James 
Hathaway’s for the proposition that political opinions can be conveyed in actions 
as well as words. See Brief for Respondent, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 
(1992) (No. 90-1342); see also Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International 
Law 31 (Oxford University Press 1st ed. 1983); James Hathaway, The Law of 
Refugee Status 152 (Cambridge University Press 1st ed. 1991). Neither the 
majority nor the dissent referenced any of these authorities. 
80.  502 U.S. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent cites 
the UNHCR Handbook for the proposition that fear of prosecution and 
punishment for desertion or draft-evasion does not constitute a well-founded fear 
of persecution under the 1967 Protocol. Id. at 489. 
81.  502 U.S. at 482; see also Richards v. Unites States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); 
INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); INS v. Phinapathya, 464 U.S. 
183, 189 (1984). Although the majority in Cardoza-Fonseca looked to the plain 
meaning of the 1980 Refugee Act in determining that the “well-founded fear” 
standard does not require a showing that it is more likely than not that a 
claimant will be persecuted upon return to her home country, it also relied on an 
extensive analysis of the legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act. 480 U.S. at 
436 (citing the Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the 1946 Constitution of 
the International Refugee Organization, and the UNHCR Handbook). Justice 
Stevens, who authored the dissent in Elias-Zacarias, wrote the majority opinion 
in Cardoza-Fonseca. Justice Scalia concurred with the decision in Cardoza-
Fonseca, but objected to the majority’s reliance on the legislative history of the 
1980 Refugee Act in reaching that result. 
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political opinion.82 His conclusions here are made without reference to 
any authority, foreign or domestic.83 
The failure of the Elias-Zacarias majority to utilize the 
sources upon which the 1980 Refugee Act is based, namely 
international human rights law or other countries’ interpretations of 
the treaties, was criticized by several observers shortly after the 
decision was published. For example, the Chair of Canada’s 
Immigration and Refugee Board criticized the majority opinion for its 
failure to “cite a single international precedent, judicial or academic,” 
and noted that most jurisdictions throughout the world had found 
that the refusal to join a guerilla group constitutes a political 
opinion.84 This is another example of the failure of most U.S. courts to 
consider the interpretations of the Refugee Convention or the 1967 
Protocol by other signatories to those treaties.85 
As a result of Elias-Zacarias, few asylum claims have been 
adjudicated on the basis of political neutrality over the past two 
decades.86 Rather, in most cases, neutrality claims are subsumed 
                                                                                                                                     
82.  502 U.S. at 482–83. 
83.  Even as a matter of basic statutory interpretation, one could argue that 
the Elias-Zacarias decision is flawed.  The court failed to cite its own seminal 
precedent on the right not to express a political opinion, West Virginia State Bd. 
of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a 
challenge by Jehovah’s Witnesses as to the constitutionality of a state law 
requiring children in public schools to salute the U.S. flag and pledge allegiance to 
the U.S. government. 
84.  R.G.L. Fairweather, Temporary Sanctuary Tends to Get Permanent; 
Political Persecution, New York Times, Mar. 7, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1992/03/07/opinion/l-temporary-sanctuary-tends-to-get-permanent-political-
persecution-043892.html. The IRB hears all first instance claims for asylum in 
Canada. As a matter of asylum adjudication procedure, it is akin to the 
Immigration Court in the United States and the AIT in the United Kingdom. See 
Meili (2015), supra note 38; see also Meili (2014), supra note 38, at 634–35; 
Musalo, supra note 8, at 1191–92 (criticizing the Elias-Zacarias majority for 
ignoring international precedent when interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act); 
William John Wingert, Closing the Door on Asylum-Seekers: Persecution on 
Account of Political Opinion after INS v. Elias Zacarias, 13 B.C. Third World L.J. 
287, 307 (1993) (noting that in its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court, the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees asserted that the government’s position in 
Elias-Zacarias would contravene U.N. policy by requiring a higher standard of 
proof for humanitarian relief and by rejecting forced recruitment as a political 
activity that can justify refugee relief). 
85.  See Marouf, supra note 15. 
86.  See Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 372–74. One branch of the political 
neutrality doctrine that has survived Elias-Zacarias, at least in the Ninth Circuit, 
is known as “hazardous neutrality.” Thus, in Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 
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under the category of imputed political opinion.87 That is, the 
applicant asserts that the persecutor has interpreted her neutrality 
as a sign of political opposition and persecuted her as a result. For 
example, in Singh v. Ilchert, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to the 
applicant because the Indian government persecuted him due to its 
erroneous belief that he was a supporter of Sikh separatists.88 This 
argument has been endorsed by U.S. Customs and Immigration 
Services, whose Asylum Office notes that “the persecutor may impute 
an opposition political opinion to anybody who is neutral.”89 
Even in the Ninth Circuit, where the neutrality doctrine was 
once robust, the court requires more than refusal to participate in a 
conflict in order to allow asylum based on neutrality. For example, in 
Rivera-Moreno v. INS, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the refusal to 
join any political faction, by itself, is “not ordinarily” an “affirmative 
                                                                                                                                     
2000) the Court noted that since the Elias-Zacarias decision, the Ninth Circuit 
has “stated unequivocally that its pre-Elias-Zacarias decisions holding that 
persecution on account of political neutrality in an environment in which political 
neutrality is ‘fraught with hazard’ is a basis for asylum.” Id. at 656 (citing Sangha 
v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1997)). On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit 
takes a much more restrictive approach, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “political 
opinion” interpretation as including neutrality. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive 
Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990). According to the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would “create a sinkhole that would 
swallow the rule.” Id. at 1298. The First Circuit has taken something of a middle 
ground on the issue, requiring an applicant whose claim is based on political 
neutrality to demonstrate a well-founded fear of one of the following: (1) a group 
with the power to persecute him intends to do so specifically because the group 
dislikes neutrals, or (2) such a group intends to persecute him because he will not 
accept its political point of view, or (3) one or more groups intend to persecute him 
because each (incorrectly) thinks he holds the political views of the other side. 
Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990). Of course, both Novoa-
Umania and Perlera-Escobar predate Elias-Zacarias. The lack of post-Elias-
Zacarias jurisprudence on neutrality from either the First or Eleventh Circuits 
renders it difficult to conclude that a circuit split exists on this issue. See also 
Mark G. Artlip, Neutrality as Political Opinion: A New Asylum Standard for a 
Post-Elias-Zacarias World, 61 Chi. L. Rev. 559 (1994); Bruce J. Einhorn, Political 
Asylum in the Ninth Circuit and the Case of Elias-Zacarias, 29 S.D. L. Rev. 597 
(1992); Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of “Persecution” in American 
Refugee Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 Suff. 
Transnat’l. L.J. 1 (1990). 
87.  See Anker (2014), supra note 1, at 372–74. 
88.  69 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 1995). 
89.  See Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Asylum Eligibility, Part III: 
Nexus and the Five Protected Characteristics 57 (Mar. 12, 2009). 
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expression of a political opinion.”90 Courts now require some form of 
affirmative expression of neutrality.91 Thus, in Tecun-Florian v. INS, 
the Ninth Circuit held that even though the applicant had testified 
that he was told by the Guatemalan guerillas that tried to recruit him 
that they were persecuting him because he refused to join them, such 
evidence was not sufficient to justify asylum.92 The Ninth Circuit 
explicitly (and one might assume bitterly) stated that it was “bound 
by the authority of Elias-Zacarias,” and refused to reverse the BIA’s 
determination that the guerillas’ persecution of Tecun-Florian was 
not motivated by their perception of his religious or political beliefs.93 
As the following discussion of the U.K. Supreme Court’s 
decision in RT (Zimbabwe) highlights, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
narrow view of what constitutes a political opinion is at odds with the 
                                                                                                                                     
90.  213 F.3d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 2000). This conclusion seems to be strongly 
influenced by the very similar language in the majority opinion in Elias-Zacarias. 
See 502 U.S. at 483; see also Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that while political neutrality can be the basis for asylum in the 
Ninth Circuit, the claimant must do more than simply avow his neutrality; he 
must show that he had “articulated [it] sufficiently for it to be the basis of his past 
or anticipated persecution”). 
91.  See Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that 
neutrality may be considered a political opinion where the applicant affirmatively 
chose to remain neutral, articulated that opinion, and had been or reasonably 
could be singled out for persecution on the basis of that neutrality); see also 
Rivera-Moreno v. INS, 213 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that applicant did not 
establish that guerillas sought to persecute her because of her neutrality). 
92.  See Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that such “evidence presented was not so compelling that no reasonable fact 
finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution”). 
93.  Mr. Tecun-Florian testified that his refusal to participate in the 
Guatemalan conflict was the result of his religious and political beliefs, but the 
majority found insufficient evidence linking those beliefs to the guerilla’s 
persecution of him. Id. In his dissent, Judge Ferguson asserted that the majority 
had read Elias-Zacarias too broadly, and that it does not stand for the proposition 
that “persecution following a refusal to assist can never constitute a basis for 
seeking asylum.” Id. at 1112 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). What rendered Elias-
Zacarias inapplicable to Tecun-Florian, in Judge Ferguson’s view, is that Mr. 
Tecun-Florian’s aversion to the guerillas was motivated by religious and political 
beliefs, rather than a desire to avoid conflict. Thus, Ferguson’s dissent highlights 
the distinction drawn by the Elias-Zacarias majority between politically-based 
neutrality and neutrality based on “indifference, indecisiveness, and risk 
averseness.” 502 U.S. 478, 483. Indeed, in stating that “the absence of any 
political motive was the key to the Court’s holding that Mr. Elias-Zacarias was 
not eligible for asylum,” Judge Ferguson appears to endorse the Supreme Court’s 
distinction between active and passive forms of political neutrality for purposes of 
asylum eligibility. Id. at 1112. 
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human rights norms upon which the Refugee Convention is based. As 
such, Elias-Zacarias and its progeny detract from a unified 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, rendering it more 
susceptible to the interpretive whims and cultural biases of 
individual states, and thus less protective of refugees.94 Given  
its position as one of the world’s most prevalent destinations for  
asylum-seekers, with well-developed asylum jurisprudence, the 
United States considerably influences how other states interpret the 
Refugee Convention.95 Its reluctance to engage vigorously in judicial 
conversations about that interpretation, however, has left its full 
potential unfulfilled and thus impeded the development of evolving 
international norms of refugee protection.96 It also impedes the 
development of a unified application of human rights law more 
generally. 
IV. NEUTRALITY AS GROUNDS FOR ASYLUM IN  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In RT (Zimbabwe), the U.K. Supreme Court considered 
whether neutrality constitutes a political opinion for purposes of 
asylum.97 RT, who was deemed to be a credible witness, had never 
been politically active in Zimbabwe or in the United Kingdom.98 She 
                                                                                                                                     
94.  See Marouf, supra note 15, at 485 (positing that the U.S. courts’ failure 
to engage with foreign courts on questions of asylum law contributes to disparate 
refugee policies internationally, despite common treaties and governing norms); 
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 194–95. 
95.  See Marouf, supra note 15, at 484 (finding that “[t]he United States is 
one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world, with one of the most 
developed and influential bodies of case law on asylum”). According to the 
UNHCR, the United States received over 70,000 asylum applications in 2012, the 
most recent year for which statistics are available. See United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Top Population Outflows by Origins: Refugees v. 
Asylum-Seekers 6 (2012) available at http://www.unhcr.org/52a722559.html 
(noting that the United States ranked behind only South Africa in the number of 
asylum applications received for that year). 
96.  Marouf, supra note 15, at 485. 
97.   RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2012] UKSC 38 (U.K.), paras. 24–52. The Supreme Court’s judgment in RT 
(Zimbabwe) also included a judgment in KM (Zimbabwe) (FC) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 38. 
98.  Id. paras. 5, 8. Three other claimants, in addition to RT, were before the 
U.K. Supreme Court. All three were determined not to be credible by  
First-Tier immigration judges. Two of these claimants (SM and AM) provided 
inconsistent testimony about their support for the opposition and their political 
activity generally. Id. paras. 6–7. The immigration judge found that the other 
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supported neither the government of Robert Mugabe and the ruling 
Zanu-PF party nor the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(“MDC”).99 She left Zimbabwe legally in 2002 and was given leave to 
enter the United Kingdom for six months, where she worked as a 
nanny for a family.100 She overstayed her leave and claimed asylum in 
2009.101 
In ruling on RT’s claim, the U.K. Supreme Court considered 
substantial evidence that the Mugabe regime tortured anyone who 
failed to profess loyalty to the Zanu-PF party.102 Militia gangs set up 
                                                                                                                                     
claimant (KM) was not a reliable witness regarding events in Zimbabwe. Id. 
para.12. The Supreme Court remanded the cases of SM and AM to the Upper 
Tribunal in order to determine whether their lack of overall credibility would 
render their claims baseless. Id. paras. 64–65. The Supreme Court allowed KM’s 
appeal because his son’s status as a successful asylum-seeker in the United 
Kingdom on account of his support for the opposition MDC would be discovered by 
the ruling Zanu-PF party and thus place KM "in an enhanced risk category by 
making it more difficult for him to demonstrate his loyalty to the regime." Id. 
para. 66. 
99.  Id. paras. 5, 61. 
100.  Id. para. 4. 
101.  Id. para. 4. 
102.  See id. para. 16 (discussing the implementation of various violent acts 
threatened against anyone perceived to be disloyal to the Mugabe regime). One of 
the key differences between the asylum adjudication systems in the United States 
and the United Kingdom pertinent to this Article is the United Kingdom’s use of 
so-called “Country Guidance” decisions at the Upper Tribunal. Such decisions are 
usually based on an extensive record of written reports from a variety of sources, 
as well as live testimony by experts on the country from which the claimant is 
seeking protection. Country Guidance decisions are considered authoritative in 
any subsequent appeal involving the same country of origin. See Symes & Jorro, 
supra note 41, at 1080–81. Once a particular claim is identified as a Country 
Guidance matter, the parties frequently bolster their country condition 
information, aware that the eventual decision will be referenced by litigants and 
courts in future cases, at least until circumstances within the country of origin 
warrant a revised Country Guidance decision. Id. Thus, in RT (Zimbabwe), the 
U.K. Supreme Court relied heavily on the Upper Tribunal’s Country Guidance 
decision in RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG, [2008] UKAIT 00083, in concluding 
that the claimants would likely face persecution for their political neutrality if 
they were forced to return to Zimbabwe. See RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, paras. 15, 
16, 57–59. This enabled the U.K. Supreme Court to determine that the claimants’ 
fear of such persecution was “well-founded” for purposes of the Refugee 
Convention. Id. para. 42. The United States, in contrast, employs no such Country 
Guidance system. Country conditions are generally considered de novo with each 
asylum claim filed in the United States. Thus, in Elias-Zacarias, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made no references to (and was not bound to consider) decisions of 
prior courts regarding country conditions in Guatemala in determining whether 
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roadblocks across the country at which persons were required to 
produce a Zanu-PF card or sing the latest Zanu-PF campaign songs. 
The inability to meet these requirements was interpreted as evidence 
of disloyalty to the party and thus support for the opposition.103 
According to the U.K. Supreme Court: 
In deploying these militia gangs the regime 
‘unleashed against its own citizens a vicious campaign 
of violence, murder, destruction, rape and 
displacement designed to ensure that there remains of 
the MDC nothing capable of mounting a challenge to 
the continued authority of the ruling party.’ People 
living in high density urban areas and rural areas 
were most at risk of being required to demonstrate 
loyalty. Those living in more affluent, lower density 
urban areas or suburbs were at less risk.104  
RT’s claim was denied by the Home Office and her appeal to 
the First-Tier of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal was 
dismissed in July 2009. She appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which 
dismissed her appeal on the grounds that “she is in a position to 
explain that she has never been politically involved at home or 
abroad, should anyone see fit to enquire.”105 The Court of Appeal, 
referencing new country condition information revealing the scope of 
persecution of politically neutral persons by the Zanu-PF, ruled that 
her claim for asylum should have been allowed.106 The Home 
Secretary appealed to the U.K. Supreme Court. 
Prior cases involving similar Zimbabwean applicants held 
that whether asylum should be granted depended on the importance 
to the individual of the human right at issue.107 For example, in TM 
                                                                                                                                     
Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s fear of retribution by the guerillas was well-founded. See 
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
103.  See RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 15. 
104.  Id., quoting the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal country guidance 
opinion in RN (Zimbabwe), UKAIT 00083 (2008) para. 215. The evidence in the 
record did not suggest that any of the applicants in RT (Zimbabwe) would be 
returning to more affluent, lower density urban areas or suburbs. 
105.  Id., para 5. 
106.  RM (Zimbabwe) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWCA 
(Civ) 1285, [42]. The Court of Appeal remitted (or remanded, in U.S. 
jurisprudential parlance) the cases involving the non-credible witnesses to the 
Upper Tribunal in order to determine whether their cases would fail for lack of 
proof. Id. at [46], [52]. 
107.  In Gomez v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, INLR 549 (2000), the 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) recognized that political neutrality could form the 
basis of an asylum claim, but focused on situations where neutrality was equated 
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(Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department108 the 
Court of Appeal held that: 
If the proposed action giving rise to the persecution is 
at the core of a human right, the individual is entitled 
to persist in it notwithstanding the consequences; he 
is not required to be discreet. However, if the 
proposed action is at the margins, persistence in the 
activity in the face of the threatened harm is not a 
situation of being persecuted and does not attract 
protection.109  
The Court of Appeal went on to hold that the requirement of 
claiming loyalty to a ruling regime engages only the margins of the 
human rights of the politically indifferent. Such persons “could be 
expected to be . . . less than frank with the Zimbabwean authorities. 
They would not be required to modify their beliefs or opinions in any 
real way.”110 
The U.K. Home Office asserted a similar “core v. margin” 
argument before the U.K. Supreme Court in RT (Zimbabwe). It 
argued that there is a distinction between “committed” political 
neutrals and those to whom neutrality is a matter of indifference.111 
In effect, the government averred that the Refugee Convention does 
not protect interference with matters at the margins of an 
individual’s right to hold or not hold a political opinion, as opposed to 
those matters that lie at the core of that right. Justice Scalia adopted 
a similar analysis in Elias-Zacarias when he distinguished between 
those who affirmatively state their political neutrality from those 
whose neutrality is based on “indifference, indecisiveness, and risk 
averseness.”112 
A unanimous U.K. Supreme Court, with an opinion by Lord 
Dyson, rejected this distinction for several reasons, the foremost of 
which was that the right not to hold a political opinion is a 
fundamental right recognized in both international and human rights 
                                                                                                                                     
with opposition to a regime. Thus, the Gomez decision focuses more on neutrality 
leading to an imputed political opinion of opposition rather than neutrality as a 
protected right in itself. Interestingly, the court in Gomez referenced a line of 
Belgian decisions holding that political neutrality constituted a protected ground 
for asylum under the Refugee Convention. Id. (citing Jean-Yves Carlier, Who is a 
Refugee (1997) at 104 n.215 ). 
108.  [2010] EWCA Civ 916. 
109.  Id. para. 40. 
110.  Id. para. 41. 
111.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 41. 
112.  502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). 
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law.113 The Court emphasized that those sources of law draw no 
distinction between “margin” and “core”: “[T]he right not to hold the 
protected beliefs is a fundamental right which is recognised in 
international and human rights law and . . . the [Refugee] Convention 
too. There is nothing marginal about it.”114 
The Court also noted that it is “unprincipled and unfair” to 
determine refugee status by reference to an individual’s strength of 
feeling about his protected characteristic; there is no yardstick by 
which the intolerability of the experience could be measured.115 
Similarly, it held that: “There is no support in any of the human 
rights jurisprudence for a distinction between the conscientious non-
believer and the indifferent non-believer[.]”116 Lord Kerr made a 
similar point in his concurring opinion: 
The level of entitlement to protection cannot be 
calibrated according to the inclination of the 
individual who claims it. The essential character of 
the right is inherent to the nature of the right, not to 
the value that an individual places on it.117  
The U.K. Supreme Court embarked on a two-part inquiry in 
reaching its decision to grant asylum to RT.118 First, it analyzed 
whether the principle which the Court articulated in its 
groundbreaking 2010 decision in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department applied to RT.119 HJ Iran 
recognized that refugee status cannot be denied to a person simply 
because he could conceal his homosexuality to avoid persecution.120 
                                                                                                                                     
113.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 42. Lord Hope, Lady Hale, Lord 
Clarke, Lord Wilson and Lord Reed agreed with Lord Dyson’s opinion. Lord Kerr 
submitted a brief concurring opinion. The other reasons for the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of the core-margin distinction are: (1) it would be difficult to draw the 
distinction in practice (“Where is the core/marginal line to be drawn?” (Id., para. 
46)); and (2) a misreading of the Court’s acceptance of a core/marginal distinction 
in HJ (Iran), which concerned the nature of the activity which the government is 
trying to suppress, rather than whether the right being protected is fundamental 
to human dignity. Id. para. 47. 
114.  Id. para. 42 (emphasis in original). 
115.  Id. para. 42. 
116.  Id. para. 45. 
117.  Id. para. 74. 
118.  Id. paras. 22–23. 
119.  HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] 1 AC 
596. 
120.  RT Zimbabwe, UKSC 38, at paras. 23–27. HJ (Iran) has been 
criticized in some quarters for unnecessarily widening the scope of “well-founded 
fear” to include situations where the risk of harm would never accrue because the 
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And second, the Court considered whether there was a sufficient risk 
that RT would face persecution on the grounds that she would be 
perceived to be a supporter of the opposition MDC. That is, whether 
there was sufficient risk of persecution to justify an asylum claim 
based on an imputed political opinion. It is with respect to the first of 
these inquiries that the Court followed the human rights approach, 
concluding that the right not to hold or express an opinion is 
fundamental to human dignity and, as such, is within the scope of the 
Refugee Convention.121 
In pursuing this inquiry, the Court first concluded that the 
same principle which guided its opinion in HJ (Iran) applied to any 
person who has political beliefs and is forced to conceal them in order 
to avoid persecution.122 The more difficult question, which the Court 
addressed, involved whether that principle applied to “the person who 
has no political beliefs and who, in order to avoid persecution, is 
forced to pretend that he does.”123 
In order to answer this question, the U.K. Supreme Court 
first set out to establish that the right not to hold a political opinion 
lies within the ambit of fundamental rights deserving of international 
protection. In doing so, it relied heavily on both international law 
(i.e., treaties and other instruments) and foreign law (i.e., the law of 
other jurisdictions), as well as academic scholarship. Much of its 
analysis here centered on the question of whether the right not to 
                                                                                                                                     
claimants had “decided that disguising their sexual identity and avoiding conduct 
associated with their sexuality was the safest course of action.” See James 
Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, Queer Cases Make Bad Law, 44 NYU J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 315, 331 (2012). Hathaway and Pobjoy also criticize the HJ (Iran) decision for 
focusing on the exogenous harms likely to accrue from an openly gay life in Iran 
(which, again, the claimants acknowledged they could avoid by disguising their 
sexuality) while ignoring the more likely endogenous harm that results from the 
repression of one’s sexuality. Id. at 333, 347. Finally, Hathaway and Pobjoy fault 
HJ (Iran) for elevating certain behaviors which place openly gay persons at risk of 
harm (e.g., citing to the U.K. Supreme Court’s identification of  “a life of Kylie 
concerts, exotically coloured cocktails and ‘boy talk’ with straight female friends”) 
to the level of fundamental reasons for risk of harm contemplated by the Refugee 
Convention’s “for reasons of” clause. Id. at 339, 374 citing HJ Iran at 646.  
Hathaway and Pobjoy distinguish these activities from those which cannot be 
avoided without significant human rights cost. Id. at 335.  The Hathaway and 
Pobjoy critique has, in turn, been criticized by other scholars. See, e.g., Ryan 
Goodman, Asylum and the Concealment of Sexual Orientation: Where Not to Draw 
the Line, 44 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 407 (2012). 
121.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, paras. 25–40. 
122.  Id. para. 26. 
123.  Id. para. 29. 
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hold and express an opinion is fundamental to human dignity. An 
affirmative answer to that question would undercut the basis for the 
distinction between core and margin consistently stressed by the 
Home Office, as well as by the Court of Appeals in the earlier 
Zimbabwean neutrality case of TM (Zimbabwe). 
The U.K. Supreme Court began its inquiry into the scope of 
the right to freedom of expression by analyzing those international 
instruments which recognize the importance of fundamental rights 
generally. Toward this end, the Supreme Court noted that the 
Preamble to the Refugee Convention references the UN Charter and 
the UDHR for the proposition that all human beings should enjoy 
fundamental human rights without discrimination.124 Moreover, the 
Court referenced the tenth recital of the 2004 EU Qualification 
Directive on Asylum Law, which emphasizes respect for fundamental 
rights, particularly human dignity and the right to asylum.125 Having 
established that international human rights instruments protect the 
wide exercise of fundamental freedoms without discrimination, the 
U.K. Supreme Court next considered whether the human right to 
freedom of thought, opinion, and expression extended to the freedom 
not to hold and not to have to express an opinion.126 Here, too, the 
Court relied on international human rights norms, in particular the 
UN Human Rights Committee comments on ICCPR Article 18, which 
protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,127 
                                                                                                                                     
124.  Id. para. 29. 
125.  Id. para. 30. The 2004 EU Qualification Directive on Asylum Law, by 
which the U.K. agreed to be bound in 2006, requires EU Member States to offer 
protection to claimants who fear persecution and serious harm in their home 
countries and to ensure the maintenance of family unity. See Council Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 Apr. 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and 
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons 
Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection 
Granted [2004] OJ L304/12 [Hereinafter 2004 Qualification Directive]. The Tenth 
Recital of the 2004 Qualification Directive states: “This Directive respects the 
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized in particular by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular this 
Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and the right to asylum of 
applicants for asylum and their accompanying family members.” 
126.  Id. para. 32. 
127.  ICCPR article 18 states: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
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and ICCPR Article 19, which protects the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression.128 According to General Comment 22 to Article 18, 
the terms “belief” and “religion” are to be “broadly construed.”129 That 
Comment further indicates that Article 18 protects “theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any 
religion or belief.”130 Moreover, the Court cited the General Comment 
to Article 19 for the proposition that freedom of opinion and 
expression are “indispensable conditions for the full development of 
the person.”131 Of particular importance for the Court’s analysis here 
was the admonition in the Comment on Article 19 that: “Any form of 
effort to coerce the holding or not holding of an opinion is prohibited. 
Freedom to express one’s opinion necessarily includes freedom not to 
express one’s opinion.”132  
                                                                                                                                     
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, 
legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions.  
128.  ICCPR article 19 states: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this 
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only 
be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public 
order . . . or of public health or morals.  
129.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22: Article 18 (Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience or Religion) (48th session, 1993). Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35, para. 2 (1994). 
130.  Id. 
131.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression) (102nd Session, 2011), para. 2. 
132.  Id. para. 10. 
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In buttressing its conclusion that the right not to have or 
express a political opinion is fundamental to human dignity, the 
Court drew on foreign case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights and several common law jurisdictions. For example, in 
Kokkinakis v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
protects freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, covers “atheists, 
agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned.”133 Moreover, the Court cited 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa for the proposition that “the 
right to believe or not to believe, and to act or not to act according to 
his or her beliefs or non-beliefs, is one of the key ingredients of any 
person’s dignity.”134 
The Court also drew on U.S. law, citing the landmark 
Supreme Court decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette135 for the proposition that “the freedom not to speak [is] an 
integral part of the right to speak.”136 In that case, the Supreme Court 
had held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was 
unconstitutional.137 The U.K. Supreme Court quoted with approval 
the following iconic excerpt from the Barnette opinion:  
If there is any fixed star in the our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
                                                                                                                                     
133.  Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 
25, 1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int. Article 9 of the ECHR states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
134.  RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2012] UKSC 38 (U.K.), para. 38 (quoting Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of 
Educ. 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, para. 36 (S. Afr.)). 
135.  Id. para. 37. 
136.  Id. (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
634–35, 642 (1943)). 
137.  319 U.S. at 642. 
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therein. If there are any circumstances which permit 
an exception, they do not now occur to us.138  
Ironically enough, neither the majority nor the dissent in 
Elias-Zacarias referred to Barnette. 
Finally, the Court cited Professor James Hathaway, the 
principle proponent of the human rights approach to asylum law, for 
the proposition that “refugee law ought to concern itself with actions 
which deny human dignity in any key way, and that the sustained or 
systemic denial of core human rights is the appropriate standard.”139 
Indeed, the RT (Zimbabwe) Court made it abundantly clear 
that it was adhering to the human rights approach when it stated 
that: 
it would be anomalous, given that the purpose of the 
[Refugee] Convention . . . is to ensure to refugees the 
widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights 
and freedoms, for the right of the “unconcerned” to be 
protected under human rights law, but not as a 
religious or political opinion under the [Refugee] 
Convention.140  
In this way, the Court averred that the range of political 
opinions protected under the Refugee Convention must be equivalent 
to those protected under international law.141 
The U.K. Supreme Court thus concluded that the “HJ (Iran) 
principle” applied to the acts in RT (Zimbabwe); that is, as long as the 
right which is being interfered with by the persecutor is fundamental 
to a person’s dignity, the abrogation of that right is a valid basis for 
asylum, even if that right is not being actively expressed or could be 
hidden. Further, as long as the claimant can credibly demonstrate 
her political neutrality (which RT was able to do in this case) and 
supplies sufficient evidence regarding the persecution of those who 
claim neutrality in the applicant’s home country (which was provided 
through the Country Guidance opinion in RN), the “political opinion” 
prong of the Refugee Convention analysis will be satisfied.142 There is 
                                                                                                                                     
138.  RT (Zimbabwe), para. 37 (quoting 319 U.S. 624, 642). 
139.  Id. para. 39 (quoting Hathaway, supra note 19, at 108). 
140.  Id. para. 40. 
141.  Lord Dyson made a similar connection between international human 
rights law and the Refugee Convention when he concluded that “the right not to 
hold the protected beliefs is a fundamental right which is recognized in 
international and human rights law and, for the reasons I have given, the 
[Refugee] Convention too.” Id. para. 42 (emphasis in original). 
142.  Id. para. 61. 
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no need for the Court to inquire as to (1) whether the claimant would 
dissemble in the face of government interrogation and (2) whether 
her dissembling would be believed.143 Indeed, the very notion of 
dissembling in order to avoid persecution would seem to be anathema 
to the Court’s characterization of the right not to express an opinion 
as fundamental to a person’s dignity. Thus, it is sufficient if the 
claimant demonstrates that she is politically neutral and that such 
neutrality will result in her persecution.144 
Having determined that the right not to have or express a 
political opinion is protected under both international law and the 
Refugee Convention, the Court turned to the second part of its 
inquiry—whether RT faced persecution on the grounds of imputed 
political belief.145 The Court first noted that such a claim will succeed 
if (1) “a declared political neutral is treated by the regime (or its 
agents) as a supporter of its opponents and persecuted on that 
account,” or (2) “there is a real and substantial risk that, despite the 
fact that the asylum seeker would assert support for the regime, he 
would be disbelieved and his political neutrality (and therefore his 
actual lack of support for the regime) would be discovered.”146 
The U.K. Supreme Court reasoned that the validity of an 
imputed political claim depended on whether there is a “real and 
substantial risk” that the political neutrality of RT and the other 
claimants would be discovered by the militia gangs and war veterans 
who established road blocks throughout Zimbabwe, even if the 
                                                                                                                                     
143.  The U.K. Supreme Court did not engage in this speculation in its RT 
(Zimbabwe) opinion. 
144.  An alternative way of analyzing the Court’s first inquiry is that it was 
concerned less with defining the scope of “political opinion” than with defining 
those circumstances under which a nexus based on an imputed political opinion 
claim might exist. In other words, the Court sought to establish whether 
international law provides protection when someone is harmed for actions related 
to their failure to have or to express a political opinion. For if it does, any 
imputation of a political opinion by the government could lead to a finding of the 
requisite nexus between that imputed political opinion and the harm suffered (my 
thanks to James Hathaway for this insight). Even under this characterization, 
however, the human rights approach has an impact: the Court’s view of what acts 
are or are not entitled to protection was informed by international human rights 
law. 
145.  RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2012] UKSC 38 (U.K.), paras. 53–54. The doctrine of implied political opinion 
under U.K. law mirrors its counterpart in the United States. See Symes & Jorro, 
supra note 41, at 220–23. 
146.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 55 (emphasis in original). 
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applicants were to lie about their allegiance to the regime.147 This 
issue, in turn, depended on two questions: 
1. Whether the claimants would be likely to be 
stopped or face serious interrogation at road blocks at 
all; and 
2. If yes, whether their pretended support for the 
regime would be disbelieved.148 
Given the prevalence of roadblocks throughout Zimbabwe and 
the fact that the claimants would not be returning to an area where 
loyalty to the regime was assumed (i.e., affluent neighborhoods), the 
U.K. Supreme Court concluded that it would be very likely that the 
claimants would be stopped at a roadblock and interrogated about 
their loyalty.149 In the Court’s view, whether their pretended support 
for the regime would be disbelieved would depend on a number of 
factors, including the kind of questions the claimant might be asked 
during a roadblock interrogation, how effective a liar the claimant 
might be in asserting loyalty to the regime, how credulous the 
interrogators might be when faced with the claimant’s lies, and 
whether the interrogators would request that the claimant produce a 
Zanu-PF card or sing its songs.150 The Court then provided a 
contradictory answer: it first asserted that it would be difficult for a 
judge in any given case to provide “confident answers” to these 
questions, but then concluded that it would be difficult for a judge to 
avoid concluding that there would be a real and substantial risk that 
a politically neutral claimant’s neutrality would be discovered if she 
were to untruthfully assert loyalty to the regime.151 On that basis, the 
Court found asylum warranted under the doctrine of implied political 
opinion, as well as because RT’s right not to hold a political opinion 
would be violated were she to return to Zimbabwe.152 
The U.K. Supreme Court’s reasoning here suggests that while 
the imputed political opinion claim would have been sufficient for RT 
in this case, there might be situations where the answers to the 
questions put forth by the Supreme Court would be less clear. For 
example, under different circumstances it might be less likely that 
the applicants would be stopped at a roadblock or more likely that 
their false support for the regime would have been believed. As a 
                                                                                                                                     
147.  Id. para. 56. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. para. 58. 
151.  Id. para. 59. 
152.  Id. para. 61. 
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result, their imputed political opinion claim would be weaker. Such 
scenarios demonstrate that an asylum claim based on an imputed 
political opinion may not be sufficient to protect an applicant’s right 
to not express a political opinion. A neutrality claim rests on evidence 
of the applicant’s refusal to state a political opinion. An imputed 
political opinion claim requires more: the applicant must provide 
evidence of the persecutor’s interpretation of that refusal. This 
distinction can make the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful asylum claims. 
In sum, RT (Zimbabwe) relied on numerous international 
human rights instruments and ample case law from the major 
common law refugee-receiving nations (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States), 
as well as scholarship on the human rights approach to asylum law, 
to support the notion that the right not to have a political opinion, 
i.e., the right “not to take sides,” is a fundamental aspect  
of human dignity. In the Court’s view, this brings political  
neutrality—whatever its motivation—well within the sphere of 
protection afforded by the Refugee Convention. The majority opinion 
in Elias-Zacarias, on the other hand, dismisses this notion with one 
phrase, asserting that not taking sides between political factions is 
not “ordinarily” the affirmative expression of a political opinion.153 
The RT (Zimbabwe) decision thus demonstrates the impact of 
the human rights-based approach to asylum law. The U.K. Supreme 
Court viewed the issue of political neutrality through the broad lens 
of fundamental rights under international human rights law and 
foreign jurisprudence. The majority in Elias-Zacarias, on the other 
hand, viewed it through the much narrower lens of statutory 
interpretation; i.e., whether not taking sides is a political opinion 
under U.S. domestic law. Justice Scalia’s analysis is bound by the 
confines of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, whereas Lord 
Dyson’s encompasses the substantial breadth of international human 
rights law. 
The next section of this Article considers the limits of the 
human rights approach by analyzing whether the results in these two 
cases would have been different had the claimants appeared before 
the other court. 
                                                                                                                                     
153.  I.N.S. v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). As noted above, earlier in 
its opinion, the majority more categorically stated that the assertion that a person 
resisting forced recruitment from guerillas is expressing a political opinion “seems 
to us untrue.” Id. at 481. 
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V. DOES THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH MATTER?  
A COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
While the opinions in RT (Zimbabwe) and Elias-Zacarias 
demonstrate the analytical differences between the human rights 
approach to asylum law and the statutory interpretation model, the 
key issue remains: did that analytical difference matter to the 
asylum-seekers in those two cases? While it certainly helped the 
applicants in RT (Zimbabwe), would it have enabled Mr. Elias-
Zacarias to obtain relief before the U.S. Supreme Court? Answers to 
these questions are suggested by analyzing how Mr. Elias-Zacarias’ 
claim would be handled by the U.K. Supreme Court and, conversely, 
how the claimants in RT (Zimbabwe) would fare before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the wake of Elias-Zacarias. 
Before undergoing this analysis, it is important to 
acknowledge one important factual difference between the two cases: 
the persecutor in RT (Zimbabwe) was the government, whereas in 
Elias-Zacarias it was a non-state actor (anti-government guerillas). 
Under both U.S. and U.K. law, when the persecutor is a non-state 
actor, the claimant has the burden to show that the government is 
unable or unwilling to control the non-governmental 
perpetrator.154 While the U.S. Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias never 
needed to reach this question, given its conclusion that Mr.  
                                                                                                                                     
154.  See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222; R v. Secretary of State, ex p 
Aitseguer [1999] 4 All ER 774; [1999] 3 WLR 1274, [1999] Imm Ar 521, [INLR 176. 
See also Symes & Jorro, supra note 41, at 220–23; UNHCR Handbook, supra note 
29, para. 65.  
Persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a 
country. It may also emanate from sections of the population 
that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the 
country concerned. A case in point may be religious intolerance, 
amounting to persecution, in a country otherwise secular, but 
where sizeable fractions of the population do not respect the 
religious beliefs of their neighbours. Where serious 
discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the 
local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are 
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities 
refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.  
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 29, para. 65. Under U.S. law, the applicant must 
present evidence that the government is unwilling or unable to control the  
non-state actor, which the BIA has held can be met when: (1) there is evidence the 
government refused protection, or an applicant repeatedly sought protection with 
little or no response (Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (B.I.A. 1998)); or (2) 
country conditions show that seeking government protection would be futile and 
dangerous. Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000). 
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Elias-Zacarias had failed to show that his alleged persecutors 
(whether state actors or not) were motivated by political 
considerations in threatening to retaliate against him, it did 
represent an additional hurdle that Mr. Elias-Zacarias would have 
had to overcome. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that the 
government was the persecutor in RT (Zimbabwe) meant that it was 
easier for the U.K. Supreme Court to conclude that the reach of its 
persecution was nationwide, and thus difficult for RT to evade.155 
While international refugee law provides protection for those harmed 
by non-state actors, the inquiry as to whether the state is unable or 
unwilling to offer protection in such circumstances is often 
challenging to asylum applicants and decision-makers.156 
A. Mr. Elias-Zacarias before the U.K. Supreme Court 
As the U.K. Supreme Court stated in RT (Zimbabwe), “it is 
well established that the asylum seeker has to do no more than prove 
that he has a well-founded fear that there is a ‘real and substantial 
risk’ or a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ of persecution for a 
Convention reason.”157 Mr. Elias-Zacarias was unable to meet that 
burden in the eyes of the U.S. Supreme Court, in part, because the 
majority distinguished between persecution on account of political 
opinion and persecution because of his refusal to fight.158 The U.K. 
Supreme Court would draw no such distinction because, based on RT 
(Zimbabwe), it would view Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s refusal to fight as a 
political opinion in and of itself. Whether that refusal was the result 
of “indifference, indecisiveness, [or] risk averseness” (a critical factor 
for the Elias-Zacarias majority) would be irrelevant. The Court found 
that his freedom to make that choice is one of the key ingredients to 
his personal dignity, protected by numerous human rights 
instruments and recognized by the highest courts of several common 
                                                                                                                                     
155.  The decision in RN documented that roadblocks where persons were 
required to pledge loyalty were established throughout the country except in 
“more affluent low density urban areas or suburbs.” RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 38 (U.K.), para. 57 
(citing RN, para. 229). Under U.S. law, when the persecutor is the government, it 
is assumed that a claimant with a valid well-founded fear of persecution 
cannot safely return anywhere within her country of origin. See 8 C.F.R.  
§ 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2013). 
156.  See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 303–32. 
157.  RT (Zimbabwe), UKSC 38, para. 55 (citing R. v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Ex p Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958). 
158.  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. 
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law countries, including the United States. Thus, any persecution 
resulting from that refusal to fight would be for a Convention-related 
reason. This demonstrates how the human rights approach broadens 
the interpretation of “political opinion” under the Refugee 
Convention. 
However, a broader interpretation of “political opinion” would 
not have automatically led to a grant of asylum for Mr.  
Elias-Zacarias. He would nevertheless have needed to demonstrate to 
the U.K. Supreme Court that: (1) he was likely to suffer harm (the  
well-founded fear or risk element) and (2) that such harm would be on 
account of his refusal to take sides in the Guatemalan armed conflict 
(the nexus element). The human rights approach would be of no help 
in regard to the first hurdle. 
We have no way of determining how the U.K. Supreme Court 
would react to the evidence Mr. Elias-Zacarias proffered regarding 
the fate of those who resisted guerilla recruitment and later returned 
to Guatemala. Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s brief contained reports 
documenting the way that Guatemalan guerillas retaliated against 
those who refused to join them.159 Mr. Elias-Zacarias testified to what 
he perceived as threats from the guerillas.160 Perhaps the U.K. 
Supreme Court might have examined the country conditions 
information provided by Mr. Elias-Zacarias and credited his 
testimony about the threats he perceived from the guerillas, and also 
found that it was likely he would be persecuted as a result of his 
political opinion. But the human rights approach to asylum law 
would be of no assistance to the Court in its evaluation of this 
evidence.161 
                                                                                                                                     
159.  See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 79, at 29–31. 
160.  These direct threats were highlighted in the dissent: “It follows as 
night follows day that the guerillas’ implied threat to ‘take’ him or to ‘kill’ him if 
he did not change his position constituted threatened persecution ‘on account of’ 
[his] political opinion.” Elias-Zacarias 502 U.S. at 489 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
The majority accused the dissenters of exaggerating the well-foundedness of Mr. 
Elias-Zacarias’s fear by transforming his testimony that the guerillas would “take 
me or kill me” into both an implied and an express threat to take him or kill him. 
Id. at 483 n.2. 
161.  Nevertheless, it is not implausible to assume that a court that has 
embraced the human rights approach to asylum law might also be more 
interested in viewing individual asylum claims in a larger geopolitical context, 
and thus more likely to consider evidence of country conditions from a variety of 
sources, including those provided by amicus briefs.  One reason that the U.K. 
Supreme Court might have taken greater note of the country conditions reports 
supporting Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s case is that the U.K.’s country guidance cases 
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On the other hand, the human rights approach may have 
been of more assistance with respect to the nexus (or “for reasons of”) 
requirement. This approach argues that the “for reasons of” 
requirement should be interpreted according to international  
anti-discrimination law.162 Both the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or other 
status.163 Unlike the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Elias-Zacarias, these conventions contain no requirement that a 
person seeking protection from discrimination prove that the violator 
intended to harm her because of her exercise of a particular right or 
because of her status.164 While such intent may be obvious in certain 
                                                                                                                                     
consider a wide variety of sources in support of its decisions. For example, in RN, 
the country guidance case on which the RT (Zimbabwe) Court relied so heavily in 
its opinion, the Upper Tribunal discussed in great detail the oral and written 
testimony of numerous witnesses, including several Zimbabweans with first-hand 
knowledge of the Zanu-PF loyalty policy, a University of Oxford professor, several 
NGOs and human rights organizations, news reports from several outlets, as well 
as the British government, in documenting the persecution of those who did not 
express loyalty to the Mugabe regime: See RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG, [2008] 
UKAIT 00083, paras. 51–149. The U.S. judiciary, on the other hand, has been 
criticized for relying almost exclusively on U.S. State Department reports in its 
evaluation of country conditions within an asylum-seeker’s country of origin. See 
Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America’s 
Asylum System, Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 2:1 1–29 (2007); Susan K. Kerns, Country 
Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary 
Playing Field, Ind. J. Global Legal Stud., 8:1, 197–222 (2000). Indeed, except for 
one article each from the New York Times, the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, and the Christian Science Monitor, the country conditions section of Mr. 
Elias-Zacarias’s brief relied almost exclusively on U.S. State Department country 
condition reports on Guatemala. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 79, at 29–31.  
As noted above, neither the majority nor dissenting opinions cited any of these 
sources. 
162.  See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 362–91 (elaborating on the 
nexus requirement for the human rights approach to asylum claims under the 
Refugee Convention). According to Lord Bingham in the House of Lords, “the 
Convention is concerned not with all cases of persecution but with persecution 
which is based on discrimination, the making of distinctions which principles of 
fundamental human rights regard as inconsistent with the right of every human 
being.” Fornah [2006] UKHL at 430 [13]. 
163.  ICCPR, art. 2.1; ICESCR, art. 2.2. 
164.  As noted above, in Elias-Zacarias the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the nexus requirement in the Refugee Act of 1980 to mean that an applicant must 
establish the persecutor intended to harm the applicant on account of one of the 
five protected grounds. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 (finding that “the 
statute makes motive critical.”). 
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situations (such as when a persecutor references an applicant’s 
political opinion while persecuting him), the human rights approach 
does not require an applicant to demonstrate such an intent. 
Therefore, while evidence of intent to harm or withhold protection for 
a Convention reason is sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement, it 
is not necessary.165 Instead, that causal link is established when “the 
applicant’s predicament—the reason for exposure to her well-founded 
fear of persecution—is linked to a Convention ground,” without the 
necessity of demonstrating the intent of the persecutor.166 Thus, 
under the human rights approach, Mr. Elias-Zacarias would not have 
had to show that the guerillas intended to persecute him for his 
political neutrality. 
The U.K. Supreme Court required no such showing with 
respect to the Mugabe regime or the ruling political party in RT 
(Zimbabwe). Therefore, Mr. Elias-Zacarias would only have had to 
demonstrate that the harm he was likely to suffer (assuming he could 
establish the requisite risk) was linked to his neutrality. He would 
most likely attempt to establish this through country condition 
evidence documenting the harm suffered by those who refused the 
guerillas’ recruitment efforts. We of course have no way of knowing 
how the U.K. Supreme Court would weigh that evidence, but the fact 
that they would even engage in that inquiry demonstrates the impact 
of the human rights approach. 
Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s claim for asylum before the U.K. 
Supreme Court under an imputed political theory would likely also 
rise or fall on the strength of country condition evidence suggesting 
that guerillas systematically persecuted those who refused to join 
their ranks. In RT (Zimbabwe), as noted above, the U.K. Supreme 
Court observed that an imputed political opinion claim will succeed in 
one of two situations: 
1) If a declared political neutral is treated by the 
regime (or its agents) as a supporter of its opponents 
and persecuted on that account; or 
2) If there is a real and substantial risk that, despite 
the fact that the asylum seeker would assert support 
for the regime, he would be disbelieved and his 
political neutrality (and therefore his actual lack of 
support for the regime) would be discovered.167  
                                                                                                                                     
165.  Hathaway & Foster, supra note 16, at 367. 
166.  Id. at 367–68. 
167.  RT (Zimbabwe) & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2012] UKSC 38, [55] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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The second of these options would most likely be inapplicable 
to Mr. Elias-Zacarias, given that he appeared unlikely to assert 
support for the guerillas because it would lead to participation in the 
civil war, which he sought to avoid. As for the first option, it is 
unclear whether the U.K. Supreme Court would consider Mr.  
Elias-Zacarias a “declared” neutral, though his refusal to join the 
guerillas would presumably land him in that category. Even if he did 
fit into this category, Mr. Elias-Zacarias would nevertheless need to 
show that neutrality (i.e. refusing to join the conflict) was treated by 
the guerillas as a sign of support for the regime and that the neutral 
party would be persecuted as a result. Here again, this would depend 
on the extent of the evidence in the record supporting such a finding. 
In sum, the human rights-based approach to asylum law 
followed by the U.K. Supreme Court in RT (Zimbabwe) would have 
advanced Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s claim beyond the “political opinion” 
stage that derailed him before the U.S. Supreme Court. That 
approach would not, however, have automatically resulted in a grant 
of asylum. He would still need to demonstrate that he would likely 
suffer harm because of that political opinion. His success here would 
depend on the U.K. Supreme Court’s analysis of evidence 
demonstrating that guerillas in El Salvador persecute political 
neutrals. His burden would be lighter than in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, because the U.K. Supreme Court would not require 
him to show that the guerillas intended to persecute him for his 
political neutrality. 
B. The Claimants in RT (Zimbabwe) before the U.S. Supreme 
Court 
It would be difficult for the claimants in RT (Zimbabwe) to get 
beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s threshold inquiry regarding 
whether their political neutrality was “the affirmative expression of a 
political opinion.”168 The Court, relying on Elias-Zacarias, would most 
likely view their neutrality as being based on indifference rather than 
conviction. Thus, like Mr. Elias-Zacarias, the claimants in RT 
(Zimbabwe) would not, in the Court’s opinion, be able to assert a valid 
argument on the grounds of an express political opinion.169 
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169.  The RT (Zimbabwe) claimants would, however, most likely prevail 
with a “hazardously neutrality” claim in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
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The claimants would have a far better chance of prevailing by 
couching their claim as one of an imputed political opinion: i.e., the 
Mugabe regime would interpret their refusal to pledge loyalty to 
Zanu-PF party as a sign of support for the opposition MDC, with 
persecution as a likely result. In Elias-Zacarias, the majority noted 
the lack of any “indication . . . that the guerillas erroneously believed 
that Mr. Elias-Zacarias’s refusal was politically based.”170 In contrast, 
the record in RT (Zimbabwe) was replete with evidence of the way 
that the Zanu-PF considered a refusal to pledge loyalty to the regime 
as support for the opposition. While there is no way to know for sure 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court would have credited this evidence 
as wholeheartedly as the U.K. Supreme Court did, this is not an 
inquiry influenced by the human rights approach. 
In sum, the broader interpretation of “political opinion” 
afforded by the human rights approach in RT (Zimbabwe) does not 
automatically lead to a grant of asylum. It does, however, make it 
easier for asylum applicants to establish that they were expressing a 
political opinion within the scope of the Refugee Convention, and thus 
eligible for asylum if they are persecuted for that reason. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has provided a concrete example of how the 
human rights approach to asylum law can aid domestic courts in 
interpreting the meaning of the Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol: the U.K. Supreme Court decision in RT (Zimbabwe) 
referenced several human rights instruments, as well as 
jurisprudence from several common law countries (including the 
United States) in determining that the right not to hold a political 
opinion is fundamental to human dignity, and thus worthy of 
protection under international refugee law. In the U.K. Supreme 
Court’s view, international human rights law dictates that political  
neutrality—regardless of whether motivated by conscious choice or 
mere disinterest—falls within the scope of “political opinion” under 
the Refugee Convention. In contrast, in INS v. Elias Zacarias, which 
remains good law, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that in most 
circumstances (and certainly where motivated by “indifference, 
                                                                                                                                     
extensive documentation that failure to demonstrate loyalty to the Mugabe 
regime routinely results in torture and other forms of persecution, the claimants 
in RT (Zimbabwe) would most likely have convinced the Ninth Circuit that 
political neutrality in Zimbabwe is “fraught with hazard.” Id. 
170.  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482. 
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indecisiveness, or risk averseness”), neutrality does not constitute 
“political opinion” under the U.S. law of refugee protection. The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinion lacks any reference to international law 
(including the Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol) or foreign 
jurisprudence. Indeed, it does not even reference its own seminal 
opinion on the right not to hold an opinion, West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette. As a result, most asylum seekers in the 
United States whose claims are based on neutrality towards warring 
factions will couch that claim as one of imputed political opinion. This 
contrast between the approaches of the U.K. and U.S. Supreme 
Courts on the question of neutrality illustrates the impact of the 
human rights approach on asylum law. Going forward, in the United 
Kingdom, applicants need not satisfy a rather arbitrary threshold of 
demonstrating a commitment to neutrality in order to satisfy the 
“political opinion” prong of the refugee definition. The human rights 
approach thus demonstrates a respect for the right not to hold a 
political opinion, regardless of its motivation or the intent of the 
claimant’s persecutor. 
On a larger scale, the human rights approach encourages a 
shared interpretation of the definition of refugee under the Refugee 
Convention. Scholars and courts around the world have identified 
such a common interpretation as critical to a uniform standard for 
refugee protection.171 When courts—like the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Elias-Zacarias—fail to consult authority beyond domestic statutory 
interpretation to determine the scope of the refugee definition, they 
undermine human rights norms convergence and contribute to the 
fragmentation of asylum law.172 
This Article has also contributed to the treaty effectiveness 
literature. It has demonstrated that human rights treaties have more 
of an impact on state actors (in this case domestic court judges) when 
a country has adopted the human rights approach to asylum law. In 
decisions like RT (Zimbabwe), human rights treaties have an impact 
on the outcome by informing a domestic court’s interpretation of key 
concepts such as “political opinion” under international refugee law. 
In contrast, such treaties have little sway on U.S. domestic courts. As 
such, one of the variables relevant to the effectiveness of 
international human rights treaties in the asylum litigation context is 
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the extent to which the country in question has adopted the human 
rights approach to asylum law. 
RT (Zimbabwe) thus presents a compelling opportunity for 
U.S. courts to develop a shared understanding of “political opinion” 
with its sister signatories to the Refugee Convention. As the U.K. 
Supreme Court’s thorough analysis demonstrated, numerous common 
law refugee-receiving nations support the principle that not 
expressing a political opinion is, itself, a political opinion. This 
support has developed, for the most part, since Elias-Zacarias was 
decided. And it is an interpretation of the law perfectly consistent 
with well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedent on not 
expressing an opinion, as exemplified by its 1943 decision in Barnette. 
Thus, adopting the RT (Zimbabwe) approach to political neutrality 
would bring the United States in accord not only with the 
jurisprudence of several influential refugee-receiving nations, but 
also with its own precedent. 
Broadening “political opinion” to include political neutrality 
regardless of motivation would come with little risk of a “floodgates” 
phenomenon (i.e., a cascade of successful asylum claims based on the 
failure to take sides in a civil conflict). For even if asylum applicants 
can credibly establish their political neutrality, they must still show 
that they will be persecuted upon return to their country of origin 
because of that neutrality. A shared understanding of the definition 
of political opinion as encompassing the right not to express an 
opinion does not make that burden any easier. 
Because most U.S. judges are unlikely to adopt a human 
rights approach sua sponte, refugee lawyers in the Unites States 
should seriously consider including a human rights-based argument 
on behalf of asylum applicants who choose not to take sides in a civil 
conflict and fear persecution as a result. While such a claim would not 
supplant the more typical imputed political opinion claim, it would 
offer an alternative means for the applicant to establish that she held 
a political opinion for purposes of U.S. law. In situations where it is 
difficult to establish the facts for an imputed political opinion claim, 
this could make the difference between a successful and unsuccessful 
asylum application. 
Invoking human rights treaties in support of asylum claims in 
U.S. courts is not without risks. Even in countries such as the United 
Kingdom where lawyers regularly reference human rights treaties on 
behalf of their clients, such arguments can prove counterproductive. 
They may alienate judges who are antagonistic toward human rights 
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treaties generally. And even among sympathetic judges, they may 
appear to be irrelevant at best or a sign of desperation at worst.173 
Thus, references to international human rights law in interpreting 
the asylum provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act must 
be carefully considered and artfully argued. 
However, such risks would appear to be minimal in the case 
of using human rights instruments to assist in the interpretation of 
the meaning of “political opinion” under U.S. law, which is, of course, 
based on the Refugee Convention. Moreover, given the willingness of 
at least some U.S. courts to follow a human rights approach in the 
two decades since Elias-Zacarias was decided, it would seem entirely 
fitting for U.S. lawyers to assert such arguments.174 Invoking human 
rights law in U.S. courts would carry the additional benefit of 
encouraging those courts to contribute to a uniform interpretation of 
human rights norms. 
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